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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to Section 78-1 (a) Utah Code Annotated 1953.

The complaint

by Sew Easy was originally filed alleging fiduciary breaches
of Defendant Montague as a former employee.

Montague

counter-claimed alleging tortious interference with his new
competitive business by Sew Easy, his former employer.

This

appeal by Sew Easy is from a $50,000 default judgment
entered against it on Montague's counter-claim.

Montague

procured an ex-parte default from the clerk on the counterclaim on the grounds that Sew Easy had failed to answer
process or appear.

Sew Easy filed a written reply even

though the complaint was a reply and the case continued
normal prosecution as though no default had been entered.
The discovery proceeded until interrupted by a motion to
compel discovery and a counter-motion for a protective
order, but the Judge never ruled on the motions.

After Sew

Easy sued the Judge in an unrelated matter and their counsel
caused the Judge to be found in contempt of the Supreme
Court, the Judge issued an order show cause why the suit
should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution.

Sew Easy

failed to appear and the Judge, rather than dismiss the suit
as noticed, bifurcated the suit, dismissed the complaint,
entered an order and judgment of default for $50,000 against
Sew Easy on the counter-claim without any evidentiary
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hearing on either the claimed default or the amount of the
unliquidated damages.

From the time of the

ex-parte

dismissal-unnoticed default judgment hearing to the time of
entry of the default judgment, the court entered Montague's
proposed default order before Sew Easy's timely objections
were filed and then waited until after Montague's untimely
reply to objections was filed and then entered the default
judgment without ruling on the objections.

No evidentiary

hearing on the amount of the unliquidated damages was held.
Sew Easy was never given formal notice of entry of the
default judgment and had not received either constructive or
actual notice of the entry of the default judgment until
less than 30 days before the filing of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was the default judgment erroneous and void as a

matter of law and entered in violation of due process of law
because the procedures leading to its entry violated the
procedural rules and because the Judge was acting under the
burden of implied and express malice against Sew Easy and
its counsel?
2.

Was the default

evidentiary

damage

judgment also void because no

hearing was held

to

liquidate

and

determine the amount of the alleged tortious interference
damages suffered?
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV, Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Constitution of Utah, ARTICLE I Section 7 [Due process of
law. ]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 5. Service and Filing
of Pleadings and Other Papers.
(a) Service:
When
Required.
Except as otherwise provided in these rules,
every order required by its terms to be served, every
pleading subsequent to the original complaint unless the
court otherwise orders because of numerous defendants, every
paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a
party unless the court otherwise orders, every written
motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and every
written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment,
designation of record on appeal, and similar paper shall be
served upon each of the parties. No service need be made on
parties in default for failure to appear except that
pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief
against them shall be served upon them in the manner
provided for service of summons in Rule 4....
(b) Service: How Made. (1) Whenever under these rules
service is required or permitted to be made upon a party
represented by an attorney the service shall be made upon
the attorney unless service upon the party himself is
ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or upon a
party shall be made by delivering a copy to him or by
mailing it to him at his known address or, if no address is
known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court. Delivery
of a copy within this rule means:
Handing it to the
attorney or to the party; or leaving it at his office with
his clerk or other person in charge thereof; or, if there is
no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein;
of, if the office is closed or the person to be served has
no office, leaving it at his dwelling house or usual place
of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein.
Service by mail is complete upon
mailing....
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(d) Filing• All papers after the complaint required to
be served upon a party shall be filed with the court either
before service or within a reasonable time thereafter.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 7. Pleadings Allowed;
Motions and Orders.
(a) OMITTED
(b) Motions, Orders and Other Papers. (1) Motions. An
application to the court for an order shall be by motion
which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made
in writing, shall state with particularity the grounds
therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought.
The requirement of writing is fulfilled if the motion is
stated in a written notice of the hearing of the motion.
(2) Orders. An order includes every direction of the
court including a minute order made and entered in writing
and not included in a judgment. An order for the payment of
money may be enforced by execution in the same manner as if
it were a judgment.
Except as otherwise specifically
provided by these rules, any order made without notice to
the adverse party may be vacated or modified without notice
by the judge who made it, or may be vacated or modified on
notice.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 55. Default....
(b)
Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiff's claim against a
defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by
computation be made certain and the defendant has been
personally served otherwise than by publication or by
personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon
request of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the amount
due and costs against the defendant, if he has been
defaulted for failure to appear and if he is not an infant
or incompetent person.
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled
to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor.
If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to
carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or
to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth
of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of
any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or
order such references as it deems necessary and proper.
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the
court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment
by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in
accordance with Rule 60(b).
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 58A. Entry....
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment.
The
prevailing party shall promptly give notice of the signing
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or entry
proof of
However,
affected

of judgment to all other parties and shall file
service of such notice with the clerk of the court.
the time for filing a notice of appeal is not
by the notice requirement of this provision.

Rules of Practice—District and Circuit Court.
Rule 2.9.
Written orders, judgments, and decrees. (a) In all rulings
by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the
ruling shall within fifteen (15) days, or within shorter
time as the court may direct, file with the court a proposed
order, judgment or decree in conformity with the ruling.
(b) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and/or
orders shall be served on opposing counsel before being
presented to the court for signature unless the court
otherwise orders.
Notice of objections thereto shall be
submitted to the court and counsel within (5) days after
service.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff, hereafter "Sew Easy" filed the complaint
against the defendant, hereafter "Montague" alleging that he
breached fiduciary obligations as a former employee in
starting a competitive business and intentionally interfered
with a Sew Easy supplier

(R. pgs. 1 - 3 ) .

Montague

eventually answered and counter-claimed in verbatim reverse
that Sew Easy had interfered with the same supplier to his
new competitive business, a claim inherently denied on the
face of the complaint not requiring any other reply under
the rules

(R. pgs. 16 - 18).

Montague, the defendant

without filing the required motion or giving notice, went
ex-parte to the clerk on the false pre-text that Sew Easy,
the plaintiff was a non-appearing party defendant not
entitled to notice who had defaulted
original summons.

in answering an

Montague in this manner obtained from the
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clerk the entry of a void ex-parte default on the counterclaim (R. pgs. 21 - 22).

After receiving a copy of the

entered ex-parte default, Sew Easy filed another reply (R.
pgs. 30-31).

The parties proceeded into interrogatories and

depositions as though the erroneous default was void and of
no effect.

The prosecution of the case was blocked by the

judge's continuing refusal to rule on a motion to compel
discovery and a counter-motion for a protective order (R.
pgs. 32 - 35) .
Long after the judge should have timely ruled on the
motions, the same judge in an unrelated case was found, by
the Court of Appeals, to have been in long term contempt of
a Supreme Court order for his suppressing of a transcript.
Sew Easy's counsel procured the contempt finding (R. pgs.
104a - 115a).

Shortly before the contempt finding, Sew Easy

also through

the same counsel, added

the

judge

as a

defendant for injunctive relief in an unrelated civil rights
action in Federal Court.

Thereafter, without ruling on the

pending discovery motions, the judge sua sponte ordered a
hearing to show cause why the suit should not be dismissed
for lack of prosecution, which he was then obstructing.

The

show cause order specified that a party's failure to appear
constituted concurrence in dismissal of the suit.

Sew

Easy's written objections to dismissal were delivered late
to the court because of clerical error in mailing rather
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impaired operating cash, gave stop work

instructions to

subordinates, converted trade secrets, etc. and others (R.
pgs. 1 - 3 ) .

Montague's eventual answer after denial of a

motion to dismiss included a compulsory counter-claim that
Sew

Easy

had

relationships

tortiously

interfered

with

business

in its futile attempts to rehabilitate the

alienated key supplier on a non-exclusive basis to mitigate
their damages (R. pgs. 16 - 18). The counter-claim was in
verbatim

reverse

to

the

complaint's

interference

allegations.
3.

Ex-Parte Default - Reply:

In between discovery

proceedings, Montague presented an ex parte a Precipe for
default to the court (R. pgs. 21 - 22).

The clerk signed

and entered the Default without the required motion or
notice.

The ex-parte default included a false finding that

Sew Easy had been served with process and failed to appear
and answer defendant's counter-claim (R. pgs. 19 - 20). Sew
Easy then

incorporated

in another

"reply"

the denial

inherent in its complaint (R. pgs. 30 - 31) reinforced by
defenses

raised

in

a

deposition

and

answers

to

interrogatories (R. pgs. 32-35).
The case then proceeded as though there was a reply
until

after

the

dismissal

prosecution.
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of

the

suit

for

lack

of

4.

Sua Sponte Dismissal:

The court arbitrarily and

prematurely issued an order to show cause on September 13,
1988 why the suit should not be dismissed

for

lack of

prosecution (R. pgs. 51 - 52). The court itself had blocked
prosecution by failure to rule on discovery motions which
had been ripe for ruling for over nine months and were never
ruled on by the court (R. pgs. 48 - 50.).
The order to show cause expressly provided that failure
to appear would be considered a consent to dismissal of the
suit (R. pgs. 51 - 52).
Sew Easy elected to appear by written objections and by
reviving court blocked discovery but a clerical error of
mailing rather than hand delivery resulted in Sew Easy's
failure to appear.

The resulting court dismissal order was

never served on Sew Easy (R. pgs. 50).
Sew Easy on oral notice of the dismissal elected to refile the complaint after the judge's announced retirement in
order to avoid a confrontation over disqualification, Rule
60B U.R.C.P. and other possible corrective motions (R. pgs.
94a - 99a).
5.
Dismissal:

Spurious

Default

Judgment

Proceedings

after

The show cause hearing was held and dismissal

was ordered on September 26, 1988 (R. pg. 53).

The day

following, on September 27, 1988 Montague's counsel prepared
and submitted to the judge and mailed to Sew Easy an
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affidavit regarding costs and attorney's fees, and also on
that same day submitted the form of an order dismissing the
complaint which had already been dismissed by minute order.
The proposed order also contained an order for the clerk to
enter a default judgment on the counter-claim in the amount
of $50,000 plus fees and costs

(R. pgs. 65 - 66).

On

September 29, 1988 the judge signed the order, but no copy
of the signed order was mailed to Sew Easy.

The clerk then

entered that order of default on the 29th of September, 1988
and no notice was given of the clerk's entry of said default
order (R. pg. 67).
Sew Easy, who had been served with the proposed order
and affidavit on September 27, 1988, by mailing, filed an
objection to the entry of the default judgment on the
counter-claim on September 30, the date of the receipt in
the mail of the proposed counter-claim default order.
However, it was a day after the judge had signed the said
default order reciting the suit dismissal

hearing as

justification.
Montague also mailed to the Plaintiff a proposed form
for default judgment on September 27, 1988 which was also
received by Sew Easy on September 30, 1988 (R. pgs. 73 74).

However, the proposed form for the default judgment

was not filed with the court until October 3, 1988, which
was three days after Sew Easy filed its objections to entry
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of the default order (R. pgs. 68 - 69).

The judge took no

action with respect to the default judgment until after he
received

Montague's

dilatory

response

to

plaintiff's

objection to entry of default judgment on counter-claim (R.
pgs, 70 - 72). It was later discovered that on October 26,
1988, the day after the judge received Montague's response
to the objections, he signed the default judgment, striking
out its typed in date of the 27th of September, 1988 and
writing in the 26th of October, 1988.
6.

No Damage Hearing - No Notice of Default Order or

Judgment Entry:

Subseguent to that October 25th Montague

reply, both Sew Easy and Montague because, they received no
notice to the contrary, waited again as though the Judge was
simply totally defaulting as he had done on the discovery
motions with no ruling on either the motion or objection.
Sew Easy also knew that in the worst of all cases they were
entitled

as a matter of law and under the well-known

practice of this judge to an evidentiary hearing fixing the
unliguidated and unprovable damages before there was a final
appealable default judgment.
7.

Timely Notice of Appeal - Cost Bond and Docketing

Statement:

Sew Easy first discovered on March 8, 1989 from

examination of the file that the Judge had entered this
default on October 25, 1988, the same day Montague's reply
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was filed.

(R. pgs. 94a - 98a). Sew Easy filed its notice

of appeal on April 20, 1989.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The great risk in arguing this case is that the
cumulative gross errors and denials of due process resulting
in the entry of this default judgment on an unliquidated
compulsory

counter-claim

are so numerous, outrageous and

unbelievable that the credibility of the messenger is
instantly

suspect to the serious

judicial mind.

The

conclusion appears inescapable that Montague's counsel was
aware that there were no limits on his raw power to obtain
from the biased judge the progressive ex-parte orders
necessary to his nefarious purposes of obtaining an ex-parte
judgment without any notice or opportunity to be heard and
denying Sew Easy its day in court on the counter-claim
issues.

It appears likely that Montague's counsel acted

with increasing confidence that the judge was out looking
for an opportunity to break all the rules to retaliate
against Sew Easy and its counsel for the embarrassing Hardy
fiasco and the Sew Easy civil rights case against the judge.
The claim of due process denying absurdities begins with an
ex-parte "precipe for default" against a represented party
plaintiff resulting immediately in the entry of an ex-parte
default against the plaintiff on the counter-claim which had
been substantively replied to.
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Due process required a

motion, right to oppose and argue the claimed default, which
at worst would have resulted in an order to file another
reply.

The judge while refusing to rule on the proper

motions on discovery, and after being sued and found in
contempt concurrently ordered a show

cause hearing for,

dismissal of the "case" for lack of prosecution to clear it
from his calendar which would have been a welcomed relief to
Sew Easy.
He

used

The judge violated the scope of his own order.
Sew

Easy's

inadvertent

non-appearance

as

a

springboard to entry without prior or subsequent notice of
(1) a dismissal of the complaint only; (2) then ordered a
default judgment on the counter-claim; (3) then weeks later
entered the default judgment on an unliquidated compulsory
counter-claim for a rounded

$50,000.00 plus costs and

attorney's fees for "tortious interference" without the
required evidentiary damage hearing.

This is perhaps the

clearest case imaginable of the denial of a right to a day
in court to present evidence before the taking of property
under

the

color

of

authority

of

the

state.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE JUDGE'S IMPLIED MALICE ALONE WOULD VOID
THE JUDGMENT AND WHEN ADDED TO THE OTHER
GROSS PROCEDURAL ABORTIONS EVINCES AN
OUTRAGEOUS DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AND A
MALICIOUS COURSE OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT.

Even

if

procedures

arguendo,

had been

all

regular

14

the
that

patently
led

to

extra-legal
the

default

judgment, it was a gross denial of due process for Judge
Christoffersen to act in this case.

Sew Easy's counsel had

caused the judge to be found in contempt of the Supreme
Court with a spin off civil rights action against the judge
by counsel and the plaintiff, with the same counsel, had
sued the judge for injunctive relief in another unrelated
civil rights action.
The fact that the judge also repeatedly violated the
procedural rules, always to the prejudice of Sew Easy, and
always to the benefit of Montague, becomes powerful and
perhaps conclusive circumstantial evidence that the judge
was driven by express malice against Sew Easy and its
counsel.
See Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d. 520; 46
Am. Jur. 2d. Judges Sec. 86.
II.

THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ON UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGE
COUNTER-CLAIM IS VOID FOR LACK OF THE
REQUIRED DAMAGE EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

The default "judgment" is void on the separate grounds
that that the trial court failed to follow Rule 55 (b) (2)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in entering the
judgment.

That rule as applied by this Court clearly

reguires that, where default judgment is for other than a
sum certain or an amount that by computation can be made
certain, a hearing had to be conducted by the trial court to
ascertain the amount of the damages to which the defendant
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was entitled. Russell v. Martell, 681 P. 2d. 1193 (Utah
1984); Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch Inc., Utah, 589 P. 2d. 767
(1978) and J.P.W. Enterprises, Inc. v. Naef, Utah, 604 P.
2d. 486 (1979).

The record is clear that such a hearing is

required and that none noticed or held.

This variance is an

independent grounds for summary reversal and in other cases
the same judge has always required the damage evidentiary
hearing.
III.

THE DEFAULT - THE ORIGINAL DEFAULT, THE DEFAULT
ORDER AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT WERE ALL VOID AND
VIOLATED DUE PROCESS.

The face of the record facts as detailed reveals the
application of a specious but popular

local doctrine of

judicial interpretation of procedural and other rules in
order to infinitely

enlarge the

judicial discretion and

convenience of the judge or a "favored" party, even though
the other party's rights may be adversely affected by the
judicially self-serving interpretation.
The applications of this specious local doctrine are
legion in the record of this case.

It was no offense to the

judge that Montague's counsel procured the ex-parte first
default entry from his clerk on the (false, pre-textual)
grounds that Sew Easy had failed to answer process and
failed to appear.

The doctrine reasons that this innocent

error was not a

"material" variance from the rules and

promotes judicial efficiency.

The local doctrine holds that
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objections to be filed.

Then after timely objections were

filed, the judge ignored the requirement of first ruling on
the objections.

Then upon receipt of the very dilatory

reply he immediately signed and entered the well rounded
$50,000.00

tort

based

default

judgment

without

evidentiary hearing or ruling on the objections.

an
The

popular local "justification" includes notions that unless a
rule or

statute

specifies

that

a procedural

step

is

absolutely required then it is in the discretion of the
judge, or that laws mean what "the judge" subjectively
interprets

them

to

mean

and

nothing

more

Significantly, every one of the above

or

less.

variations

was

prejudicial to Sew Easy and in favor of Montague.
It

is

clear

by

controlling

"objective

judicial

interpretation" that all of the above specified procedural
acts violated Sew Easy's rights to its "due process day in
court."

The notion that the judge is free to apply a

meaning to the rules other than their plain meaning under
rules of construction and as interpreted by this court, so
the judge can either vent his malice or exercise unbridled
kingly discretion, is absurdly erroneous and is more antiAmerican than a Russian Ruble.

Every specified variance

denied Sew Easy its fundamental right to notice, opportunity
to be heard and present evidence and argument before the
court "deprives it of its property."
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These fundamental

there are no requirements that the judge ever rule on
discovery motions or that there are any time requirements
for ruling because it is not "material" and not absolutely
required under his interpretations.

The spurious doctrine

further reasons the court may sua sponte order dismissal of
less than the whole suit even though it is obstructing
prosecution and even though its notice specifies that the
whole suit will be dismissed*
The popular doctrine also holds that regardless of the
nature or extent of intervening conflicts or grounds for
recusal the judge may "discretionarily" stay in the case
simply because the party has the alternative remedy of
moving

for

disqualification,

and

concludes

that

his

"hanging-in" certainly promotes judicial efficiency and
economy.

Sew Easy complains that the judge's ex-parte

expansion of the suit dismissal hearings purpose from suit
dismissal as noticed, to include bifurcation, partial
dismissal, entry of a default order and judgment on the
counter-claim, all without notice or hearing, are all extra
legal.

This complaint is viewed locally as an immaterial

ACLU-type due process technicality contrary to judicial
convenience and economy.
The spurious doctrine also allowed the judge to sign
the proposed default order the day before Sew Easy received
the proposal

and

five days
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before

the

rules

allowed

rights of Sew Easy which were violated here are implemented
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
In order to dispel any notion that may exist as to
whether the violated procedural rules hereafter discussed
are to be interpreted to protect Sew Easy or for the
convenience and economy of the court under Cache County
local de facto practice we cite the following due process
based rules of construction.

The sum of the due process and

U.R.C.P. rules violations, as later detailed, is incredible
in

this

case

and

the

following

sets

the

stage

for

application of due process interpretations to those rules:
"In general, when the sovereign has
established rules to govern its own conduct,
it will be held to the self-imposed
limitation on its own authority, departure
from which denies due process of law."
This citation is from 16C C.J.S. Con. Law Sec. 969 pgs.
265 & 266 citing Layton v. Swapp, D.C. Utah 484 F. Supp.
958, above which is noted:
"Implicit in concept of due process are
ideas that government must follow its own
rules and that it must do so within
reasonable time."
The compulsory nondiscretionary nature of the sovereign's
duty

to

follow

its

own

rules

is

highlighted

continuation of the same C.J.S. citation at page 266.
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by

a

"and where a state has established procedure
which comports with due process, state and
local officials are bound to follow those
procedures."
(Citing Wolf v. Lillie v.
Kenosha County Sheriff, D.C. Wis., 504 F.
Supp. 1 vacated on other grounds C.A.)
The popular notion in Cache County that rules are to be
interpreted
sovereign

for the

convenience

and

judge or his favored parties

efficiency

of

is dispelled

the
with

finality by this court in the case of Deseret Savings Bank
vs. Francis, 62 Utah 85, 217 P. 114 (1923) and quoting from
Supervisors vs. U.S., 4 Wall 435, 18 L.Ed. 419 as follows:
"The conclusion to be deduced from the
authorities is that, where power is given to
public officers, in the language of the act
before us, or in equivalent language-whenever the public interest or individual
rights call for its exercise
-- the
language***though permissive in form, is in
fact peremptory. What they are empowered to
do for third person the law requires shall
be done. The power is given, not for their
benefit, but for his.
It is placed with the depository to meet the
demands of right, and to prevent a failure
of justice.
It is given as a remedy to
those entitled to invoke its aid, and who
would otherwise be remediless."
"In all such cases it is held that the
intent***which is the test, was not to
devolve a mere discretion, but to impose 'a
positive and absolute duty.'"
Again, from Corpus Juris Secundum:
"The due process clause require that a power
conferred by law be exercised judiciously
with an honest intent to fulfill the purpose
of the law and it is a part of the judicial
function to see that the requirement is
met..."
(16C C.J.S. Con. Law Sec. 967 pg.
254)
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This court has clearly declared in harmony with the due
process concept that a party is entitled to his day in court
on the merits of a counter-claim and unlike other judgments
and orders, this court gives no presumption of validity to
default judgments and resolves all doubts in favor of
setting aside default judgments and giving a hearing on the
merits.

This due process "day in court" rule is found in

Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d. 1189:
"Judgments by default are not favored by the
courts nor are they in the interest of
justice and fair play.
No one has an
inalienable or constitutional right to a
judgment by default without a hearing on the
merits.
The courts, in the interest of
justice and fair play, favor, where
possible, a full and complete opportunity
for a hearing on the merits of every case."
See also Locke v. Peterson, 285 P.2d.

Ill and Utah

Commercial and Savings Bank v. Trembo, 17 Utah 198 53 P.
1033.
The Court's order to show cause for dismissal for lack
of

prosecution

issued

while

the

judge

was

blocking

prosecution by his refusal to rule on discovery motions for
over nine months is a gross due process violation.
evinces judicial malice.

It also

However, if he had dismissed the

whole suit as he gave notice he would do, there would have
been no material prejudice, rather a significant benefit. A
new complaint filing would have solved many of the rulings
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defaults and disqualification problems faced by Sew Easy
with this retiring judge.
The fact that the judge expanded the noticed purpose of
the show cause hearing into an unnoticed hearing on a
phantom motion to enter a counter-claim default judgment is
but further evidence of his active malice.

That kind of

judicial trickery is clearly beyond the authority of the
court and an affront to the judicial process.

A sua sponte

dismissal for lack of prosecution to clear the calendar must
be construed as a dismissal of the dependent
counter-claim as well.

compulsory

After such dismissal of the case,

the court clearly lost jurisdiction for the purpose of
rendering any default judgment for either party:

21 C.J.S.

Courts Sec. 94; Nichols v. State, 554 P. 2d. 231; Lund v.
Third Judicial District Court, 62 P. 2d. 278; Wasatch Oil
Refining Co. v. Wade, 63 P. 2d. 1075.

This

attempted

discriminatory dismissal is especially aggravated because
the court, burdened with malice, used the dismissal as a
pretext and springboard for entering the default order and
default judgment without motion, notice or opportunity for
hearing.
The proceedings that led to the original default and
post-dismissal entry of the order for default and default
judgment all violated the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
due process in the following particulars:
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The plaintiff was never in default in reply to the
counter-claim for tortious interference with the supplier.
The complaint was, in law and substance, "a reply" to the
counter-claim so there was no failure to plead or otherwise
defend

under

Rule

55

(a)(1) U.R.C.P.

inherently denied and replied
claim.

The

complaint

to that reversed counter-

Any additional reply would in substance have been no

more than a complaint amendment.
167 (Utah 1954).

Wells v. Wells, 272 P. 2d.

Under the circumstances where there had

been a complaint, answer and counter claim and discovery was
active on issues in dispute, no default could be entered by
the clerk or the court under Rule 55 (a) U.R.C.P. until the
active adverse party was by motion and notice given his
opportunity to contest the claimed fact of a claimed default
under Rule 7 (b) (1) U.R.C.P.

Montague in both the pre and

post dismissal default proceedings would had to have given
notice under Rule 5 (a) U.R.C.P.

Both the original precipe

and first default also falsely stated the record facts
regarding the nature of the claimed default and falsely made
it appear that Sew Easy, the plaintiff, was a defendant who
had not responded to "process" as the pretext for the
outrageous ex-parte default entry.
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CONCLUSION
On the grounds that the default judgment was void
because

its entry was based

upon outrageous

multiple

violations of the rules and due process, this court should
vacate the default judgment and confirm that the case was
dismissed without prejudice

leaving

the parties

litigate the claims and counter-claims

free to

in another action

which will be filed before this appeal is heard.
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